UCLA Law Review Discourse, Volume 62
In the two decades since New York v. United States was decided, commentators have debated what should give rise to a justiciable Guarantee Clause claim. One common argument is that direct democracy inherently conflicts with the requirement, implicit in the Clause, that states provide a republican (representative) form of government. An offshoot of this argument claims that courts should conjure up substantive Guarantee Clause remedies and strike down specific initiatives that infringe individual rights. It is no surprise that California is a frequent target of this criticism.
This Article argues that California’s initiative system, by design and in operation, is aligned with the scope and purpose of the Guarantee Clause, and reinforces rather than undermines the state’s republican form of government. While an initiative can be used to amend the state constitution, laws that fundamentally change the basic governmental plan or framework must pass through the republican strictures of the revision process. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Strauss v. Horton highlights the primary pitfall of stretching the Guarantee Clause beyond its limits to protect individual rights. At its core, the Clause is directed at the structure of state government. Individual rights are better policed and protected by other constitutional guarantees, such as due process and equal protection, that are designed to protect them.
On Friday, April 11, and Saturday, April 12, 2014, the UCLA School of Law Lowell Milken Institute for Business Law and Policy sponsored a conference on competing theories of corporate governance.
This conference provided a venue for distinguished legal scholars to define the competing models, critique them, and explore their implications for various important legal doctrines. In addition to an oral presentation, each conference participant was invited to contribute a very brief essay of up to 750 words (inclusive of footnotes) on their topic to this micro-symposium being published by the UCLA Law Review’s online journal, Discourse.
These essays provide a concise but powerful overview of the current state of corporate governance thinking. Our thanks to all the participants.
This Article explores the predominate framing of student truancy and uncovers the problems associated with the prevailing framework. California Attorney General Kamala Harris frames the issue as an economic crisis in which truant students and their parents are to blame. This framing of truancy has led to punishment-based solutions that not only exacerbate the school to prison pipeline, but also are ineffective in solving truancy. Punishment for truancy disproportionately affects poor students of color. Thus, the framing of truancy needs to shift towards one that acknowledges race and poverty in order to develop productive solutions.
This Article examines the practice of cable bundling, a term describing how cable providers offer channels in “packages” of channels rather than allowing consumers to buy channels individually. These cable bundles have been criticized by politicians, academics, and the public alike, many of whom believe cable bundling simultaneously increases the price of cable and forces consumers to pay for programming they neither want nor use. Politicians have responded to these criticisms by advocating for legislation requiring cable companies to offer a la carte pricing options, in which customers can pick and choose individual channels. But evidence that an a la carte requirement would improve consumer satisfaction is scarce. Government intervention would introduce new inefficiencies to the market, thereby increasing consumer costs. Additionally, if the much maligned bundle is truly inefficient, any need for government regulation will likely be obsolete in the near future. The growing popularity of new media platforms such as Netflix, Hulu, and HBO Go will almost certainly necessitate more consumer-friendly offerings from cable companies sooner rather than later.
This study was designed to examine the potential biasing effect of gang evidence on jury verdicts. Two hundred four participants viewed one of two versions of a simulated trial that included opening statements and closing arguments by the prosecution and defense, and direct and cross-examination of the eyewitness and investigating officer. Half of the participants saw a version of the trial that included no mention of gang involvement, while the other half saw a version in which the prosecutor argued at opening and closing that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. In the gang version, participants also heard testimony from a gang expert who described the primary criminal activities of the gang. Jurors were read standard California jury instructions and deliberated in small groups. The prosecution’s case was very weak by design. Results revealed that when mock jurors were polled before deliberations, only 13 percent who saw the trial without gang evidence voted guilty compared to 36 percent in the gang condition. After deliberation, none of the jurors found the defendant guilty in the no-gang condition. However, when gang evidence was introduced, 10 percent of the jurors continued to vote guilty. When faced with potent gang testimony in the absence of persua-sive evidence, some jurors appeared to disregard reasonable doubt and vote to convict the defendant who was depicted as a dangerous gangster. This behav-ior appears to be driven by a form of jury nullification in the reverse direction, in which the defendant is judged to be deserving of punishment despite a lack of evidence related to the charge at hand. Implications of these data in the court-room are discussed.