State Enforcement of the Twenty-Second Amendment

This Essay argues that the Twenty-Second Amendment is enforceable by the states against any two-term president—including Donald Trump—who attempts to evade its requirements and seek an extraconstitutional third term. Whether Trump actually seeks such a term is an open question, though he professes to be serious about doing so, and allegedly sees multiple methods for appearing on the ballot. The narrow argument that the Twenty-Second Amendment technically allows a third presidential term under some circumstances—for example, by allowing a president to run for vice president—has not been tested, but it may soon be.

If such a theory is tested, it is a reasonable fear that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson may preclude state enforcement of the Twenty-Second Amendment. I argue that Anderson, which solely concerned the enforceability of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, has no purchase in this context. The context, text, and procedural demands of the Fourteenth Amendment differ in every way from the Twenty-Second Amendment. As such, states are not only free to enforce the Twenty-Second Amendment against two-term presidents, but they should do so—because there are no other viable entry points for enforcement.

About the Author

1855 Professor of the Law of Democracy and Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Thank you to Brian Kalt, Anthony Kreis, Vanessa Miller, and Justin Van Orsdol for comments and feedback on this Essay, as well as to the staff of the UCLA Law Review Discourse for their careful and attentive edits.

By LRIRE