Abstract
The Supreme Court has birthed a public law revolution. This revolution should not be known as a constitutional revolution because it is bigger than constitutional law—it covers statutory and administrative law as well. This revolution has been powered not by social movements, but by an interpretive philosophy known as originalism. Originalism has been deeply misunderstood by its critics. This Article examines three myths about originalism—that it is primarily about history, that it is a traditional theory of adjudication, and that it is democratic. Originalism is a semantic theory, not a theory of history, and it is a theory that privileges semantic integrity over traditional adjudicatory virtues such as prudence and precedent. Most importantly, this Article contends that originalism aggravates the minoritarian features of our Constitution. Originalists have theorized that courts must return to 1787 or 1868 because there is no popular sovereignty except at moments of amendment. To the contrary, our Founding institutions depend upon the exercise of popular sovereignty every two and four years. To the extent that originalists do not recognize this kind of sovereignty, they are unfaithful to the central texts of our Constitution.
