This Comment explains how President Trump’s changes to immigration enforcement and attempt to rescind DACA have affected undocumented students, and proposes that the student-university relationship both legally permits and morally obligates postsecondary institutions to adopt policies that protect and insulate undocumented students from the harmful effects of these changing policies.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) short-term holding cells have received mass media attention because of their inhumane and punitive conditions. CBP agents and immigration detainees alike refer to these cells as hieleras. This Comment draws attention to rights violations inside hieleras and is the first to analyze a groundbreaking class action lawsuit brought by an immigrants’ rights coalition to challenge the conditions in CBP holding cells.
An individual cannot “plead the Fifth” if asked to unlock a smartphone using a physical feature. On the other hand, an individual who possesses the same smartphone, but uses a nonbiometric password, can successfully “plead the Fifth” and refuse to disclose the password. This Comment explores this legal issue and sets forth a proposal on how courts can extend the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to biometric passwords.
This Article argues that courts unjustifiably limit public school liability under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX for student physical, verbal, and sexual harassment and abuse.
This Article articulates an understanding of the Rules Enabling Act that will equip the Supreme Court with the ability to judge a rule’s validity—and give the rulemakers much clearer guidance regarding the outer boundaries of their remit.
This Article explores the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus in light of the Court’s apparent adherence to “the doctrine of one last chance,” which requires the Court to give advance notice of its willingness to issue disruptive decisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, which struck down Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, altered the Court’s Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. That doctrine has undergone several important changes since it was first recognized. At times the doctrine has expanded, invalidating sentencing practices across the country, and at times it has contracted, allowing restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion based on findings that are not submitted to a jury. Hurst represents another expansion of the doctrine. Although the precise scope of the decision is unclear, the most sensible reading of Hurst suggests that any finding required before a judge may impose a higher sentence must first be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This reading invalidates several state capital sentencing systems and several noncapital systems, and it would require dramatic changes to federal sentencing as well.
In this Comment, I argue that the persistence of racial health disparities today is not only a relic of a long history of anti-Black racism in healthcare, but a consequence of the Court’s colorblind approach to affirmative action jurisprudence since U.C. Regents v. Bakke and the restrictions in access to predominantly white institutions that have resulted. In recounting the history of racism in medical experimentation and healthcare policy since the antebellum period, this analysis seeks to locate racism in a particular form and illustrate how notions of racism as amorphous—and therefore outside the scope of a constitutional remedy—elide the state’s role in perpetuating racial disparities that persist to this day.