A Corporate Governance Proposal for Reforming Regulation D

Abstract

This Comment argues that the explosive growth of Regulation D private offerings has outpaced the investor-protection foundations of federal securities laws. With minimal required disclosure and a lack of regulatory oversight, the Regulation D framework creates material information asymmetries
for and collective action problems among investors. Previous reform proposals—expanding Form D requirements, conditioning exemptions on more filings, and forcing private companies into public-company-style reporting—either risk exceeding the SEC’s delegated authority or fail to address investors’ abilities to access and appropriately evaluate material information.

To better balance capital formation and investor protection, this Comment proposes a tiered Regulation D framework keyed to offering size. For smaller offerings, Form D would be modestly expanded to provide investors with more reliable information. For larger offerings, issuers would choose between a targeted disclosure track and a novel corporate governance solution, an Offering Advisory Board. The Offering Advisory Board would conduct independent financial and technical diligence to provide investors with a plain-language report subject to executive certification. This approach could mitigate investor information asymmetries and weed out bad actors while preserving the dynamism of the private market.

About the Author

J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2024; M.St., University of Oxford, 2020; B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2018. I am very grateful to Professor Fernán Restrepo for his support throughout my time at UCLA and his guidance in crafting this Comment, as well as to the Law Review editors and staff for their thoughtful work and dedication. I owe much to Vidaur Durazo and Shara Burwell—my two favorite lawyers—for their love and belief in me. This Comment would not exist without them. And, most importantly, I thank my parents. All my successes are theirs.

By LRIRE