Police Power Abolition

Abstract

This Article employs the Law Review’s Discourse symposium on my book, Unreasonable: Black Lives, Police Power, and the Fourth Amendment, as a starting point to foreground and elaborate on an idea that I reference in that text: police power abolition. The Article begins by describing the central insight that motivates Unreasonable—namely, that simply limiting the frequency with which the police interact with Black people could save Black lives. If the police have fewer opportunities to stop and question Black people, they have fewer opportunities to kill us. That observation led me to think about the range of structural forces that facilitate contact between Black people and the police. Fourth Amendment law is one such force. From pedestrian checks, to traffic stops, to stops and frisks, to searches and seizures at the border, Fourth Amendment law permits the police to interact with and enact violence against Black people on the thinnest, most unreasonable of suspicions. The Article does not reprise precisely how Fourth Amendment law performs that racially subordinating work. For that, you will have to read Unreasonable and the broader body of work on which the book is based. Instead, the Article summarizes the core arguments Unreasonable propounds, links them to what I call “police power abolition,” and explains how police power abolition can provide an entry into and render more legible broader discourses about abolition. Throughout the Article, I draw on and react to the generous and generative review essays that participants in this symposium have written about the book. In the context of doing so, I explain why, notwithstanding the limitations of law as space for antiracist interventions, the legal terrain should remain a critical (though not the only or most important) site for advancing racial justice.

About the Author

Devon Carbado is the Elihu Root Professor of Law at NYU Law School and Distinguished Research Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law. The ideas expressed in this paper benefited from engagements at workshops and presentations on Unreasonable: Black Lives, Police Power and the Fourth Amendment at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, UCLA School of Law, NYU School of Law, University of Michigan Law School, University of California, Irvine School of Law, Stanford Law School, Yale Law School and the African American Policy Forum’s CRT Summer Schools. I thank Sunni Whitmore and Asha Ramachandran for excellent research assistance. Finally, I thank the UCLA Law Review not only for superb editorial support, but also for extraordinary engagement with the paper. All errors are my own.

By LRIRE