Anti-Oligarchy, Anti-Authoritarianism, The Constitution, and the Court

Abstract

In the 1930s, like today, our nation faced a crisis of oligarchy: too much wealth and political power concentrated in too few hands. Like today’s liberals and progressives, the New Dealers aimed to enact social and economic reforms that would ensure a much broader distribution of wealth and power, but they faced a hostile, right-wing Supreme Court that would certainly thwart such reforms. Thus, like liberals and progressives today, New Dealers proposed various measures aimed at curbing judicial review to safeguard the legislative reforms they saw as essential to making democracy work. Yet at the same time they hoped to preserve the Court’s power—which they hoped the Court would exercise—to defend civil liberties, protect vulnerable minorities against state violence, and safeguard the rule of law in a moment of rising authoritarianism.

This Article argues that this New Deal moment contains significant lessons for liberals and progressives today, who are once again arguing for curbing the power of a hostile, right-wing Supreme Court—while at the same time continuing to hope and demand that that same Court use its authority to thwart some of the government’s more extreme violations of the rule of law. Liberals and progressives must respond to the present crisis, but must also think about what kind of constitutional order, with what kind of Supreme Court and federal judiciary, exercising what kinds of power, we hope to build. This Article surveys the various answers in present-day debates, from abolishing judicial review, in part or whole, to reforming selection procedures to “balance” the Court. We argue, drawing on the work of the New Dealers, for a more flexible and pragmatic approach that takes the Court seriously as a political body—one that can sometimes be persuaded to back off through political confrontation. The present Supreme Court has done much—from eviscerating campaign finance and anticorruption law to attacking the administrative state—to lay the groundwork for oligarchic rule. The solution, we argue, is not to eliminate the Court’s power of judicial review or to pursue technocratic reforms that aim to put the Court above politics. Instead, liberals and progressives should lay the political groundwork now for confronting the Court through constitutional politics.

About the Author

Joseph Fishkin is a professor of law at UCLA. William E. Forbath holds the Lloyd M. Bentsen Chair in law and is a professor of history at UT Austin. Together they are the authors of The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution: Reconstructing the Economic Foundations of American Democracy (2022). The authors would like to thank Laura Kalman, Jeremy Kessler, and especially Laura Weinrib, as well as the participants in the terrific symposium at UCLA Law School in 2025 on the rise of the imperial Supreme Court, of which this Article is a part: Rachel Bayefsky, Erwin Chemerinsky, Ryan Doerfler, Lee Epstein, Linda Greenhouse, Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Victoria Nourse, Robert Post, Aziz Rana, Tom Schmidt, Maya Sen, Fred Smith, and Steve Vladeck. The authors would also like to thank the students, especially Mary Cruz and Cheyenne Smith, who successfully organized a great symposium under challenging circumstances, as well as the law students from several classes at UCLA who have ably edited all the resulting written pieces. The authors are indebted to Sruti Ramachandran, Grayson Rost, and Anran Wang for excellent research assistance.

By LRIRE