Pregnancy and Birthing Are Work: Abortion and the Thirteenth Amendment

Abstract

This Comment offers the Thirteenth Amendment as a source for the constitutional right to choose if, when, and how one has children by demonstrating that its protection from involuntary servitude includes reproductive autonomy. Specifically, it examines (1) the contemporary surrogacy industry and (2) the nature of pregnancy and birthing in combination with the exploitative nature of abortion bans and restrictions, to demonstrate that pregnancy and birthing constitute work within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. Accordingly, abortion bans, abortion restrictions, and policies that police pregnancy behaviors and outcomes collectively impose impermissible involuntary servitude.

Part I explores the Thirteenth Amendment’s legislative history, which reveals that the involuntary reproductive servitude of Black women and girls was a central driving force of the abolitionist movement. It recounts the entwined histories of forced reproduction, the Thirteenth Amendment, and abortion criminalization in the United States, followed by an overview of the Supreme Court’s judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Part II breaks down the Court’s definition of involuntary servitude into three parts: (1) forced, (2) work, and (3) for another. First, it establishes that through legal coercion and physical force, abortion bans unconstitutionally force pregnant people to continue gestating and give birth. Second, it distills from case law two standards for determining what constitutes work under the Thirteenth Amendment: the convertibility standard and the nature standard. The surrogacy industry demonstrates that pregnancy and birthing are already widely recognized as work under the convertibility standard. Moreover, under the nature standard, forced pregnancy and birthing constitute work outside the surrogacy industry. Finally, it argues that abortion bans and restrictions force pregnant people to do the work of gestation and birthing for the government. Specifically, the work of pregnancy and birthing serves the government’s interest in protecting prenatal life.

This Comment argues that abortion bans and restrictions impose impermissible involuntary servitude by legally coercing and physically forcing pregnant people to perform the work of continuing pregnancy and giving birth for the government, in service of its interest in protecting prenatal life.

About the Author

Housing Justice Fellow, Inner City Law Center. J.D., UCLA School of Law 2026; B.A. Psychology, Gender & Feminist Studies, Studio Art, Pitzer College 2017; Fulbright Scholar South Korea 2017–18. I want to express my deepest gratitude to Professors LaToya Baldwin Clark and Cary Franklin, whose respective Critical Race Theory and Reproductive Rights & Justice courses offered me the space and tools to write this Comment. I also want to thank the UCLA Law Review team, who have been so collaborative and responsive throughout the editing process. Finally, I want to thank my father, who inspired this idea in the first place, and my mother, who raised me to advocate for myself and others.

By LRIRE