Privacy and the Impossibility of Borders

Abstract

This Article argues that a meaningful conception of privacy renders borders illegitimate. For those present in a nation state without legal authorization, pursuit of their basic rights carries the real risk that identifying information collected will expose them to immigration enforcement. Such a phenomenon is becoming more real considering an expanding border enforcement apparatus that relies on information transfer from various domains of daily life. As a result, people are not able to exercise the rights to which they are entitled. Rights are meaningless in an environment where they are unable to exercise them. This Article is a response to liberal theorizing that aims to reconcile the state’s right to control its borders with its duties to all who are present in the nation state, including those who lack legal authorization. Using autoethnography and the author’s lived experience, this Article argues that the failure to make rights real moves beyond ineffectiveness and not only causes harms to illegalized people, but also stands as an imperious—yet not indestructible— barrier between law and a just world. This Article presents a unique contribution to the burgeoning literature on border abolition by highlighting the real effects that the fear of deportation has on those who are targets for the violence of the state yet ineligible for its protection.

The Article’s main interlocutors are Joseph Carens’s proposal of a “firewall” between immigration enforcement and the protection of immigrants’ basic human rights. Further, a 2018 report by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) revealed that the fear of deportation deters illegalized immigrants from reporting crimes lest they risk exposure to immigration enforcement. The report’s authors concluded that immigrants’ reluctance to report crimes or participate in court proceedings compromises the criminal justice system’s ability to protect public safety. Though helpful in many ways, the “firewalls” concept does not account for government intrusion in nonbasic rights domains, which influence whether legal rights are realized in practice.

About the Author

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social Policy 2023, UC Berkeley; J.D. 2022, Yale Law School; Philosophy B.A. 2016, The City College of New York. I first would like to thank my dissertation committee: Professors Sarah Song, Christopher Kutz, Leti Volpp, and Gideon Yaffe for their feedback and support of this project and my career. I would also like to thank Professors Robert Post, David Schleicher, Jennifer Chacón, Nyamagaga Gondwe, Jon J. Lee, David Hausman, Benjamin Levin, Erik Encarnacion, Cori Alonso-Yoder, Aya Gruber, Aniket Kesari, Orin Kerr, Andrea Roth, Sharon Jacobs, Juliet Stumpf, and David Schraub for comments on all or part of this Article. Special thanks to the Penn-Birmingham Migration initiative, especially Roberto Gonzales, Jennifer, Allsopp, and Ramon Garibaldo Valdez, for their feedback on the Article. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy program’s JSP Forum series for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this work, especially Isabella Mariani for her wonderful comments. I am also thankful to Yale Law classmates Jacob Schriner-Briggs, D Black, Greg Antill, Evan Walker-Wells, and Atticus Ballesteros as well as the members of the Yale Law & Philosophy Society for feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. Special thanks to the AALS New Voices in Immigration Law panel for important feedback on this Article. Lastly, I am thankful to Charlie Gearing, Calvin Askew, Annalise Gardella, and Sarah DiMagno for their research assistance and editing help.

By LRIRE